



# SIDS CALL TO ACTION

COP27 AND BEYOND

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**iDERA**

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## Author's Note

This policy brief was prepared by the International Development Empowerment and Representation Agency (iDERA) as part of its wider project *“Point of no return: COP27 research and advocacy support for Small Island Developing States in a 1.5°C or above scenario”* that was commissioned by the Caribbean Natural Resources Institute (CANARI) in collaboration with Panos Caribbean. It aims to enhance the voices of the most vulnerable in calling for a pro-poor, inclusive, environmentally sustainable, and climate resilient approach to economic recovery and development in the Caribbean.

It outlines the critical stances going into COP27 that Small Island Developing States (SIDS) will need to adopt for their survival as well as the negotiation strategies and collective approaches that would help propel their agenda forward at COP27 and beyond whilst highlighting the necessity for achieving a just transition both domestically and internationally.

The considerable similarities in the climate situation of small islands, not just in the Caribbean, but also those in Africa, Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific are evident. These, like so many other vulnerable countries and marginalised groups and communities, elsewhere in the world, face the equally urgent need to tackle shared climate challenges and threats. The conclusions and recommendations in this paper are therefore of relevance beyond the Caribbean.

iDERA's multi-disciplinary team developed the brief with the assistance of negotiators and officials from Small Island States as well international climate experts. The authors are particularly grateful for the well informed and reasoned contributions of all of the knowledgeable representatives and leading experts. Nonetheless, the final product and the conclusions are the responsibility of the authors themselves and do not necessarily reflect the views of any individual negotiator, representative, experts or interviewee.

*November 2022*

# SIDS CALL TO ACTION: COP 27 AND BEYOND

## Introduction

As the world plummets towards climate catastrophe, Government leaders, climate activists, business leaders head to Egypt for the annual United Nations sponsored climate summit. But will they commit to taking the measures and the urgent actions that are so desperately needed to safeguard our futures and that of our planet?

This 27<sup>th</sup> Conference of Parties<sup>1</sup> (COP27) is an opportunity for governments to recommit to a joint approach and to individually take steps and actions to slow down climate change. Now pious rhetoric needs to be matched with concrete and significant action. This is an occasion for leaders, who act on behalf of their citizens, to acknowledge the gravity of the looming climate catastrophe and take seriously the responsibility for tackling it, that has been entrusted to them. After so many summits, marked by excuses for inaction and blaming others, bold and decisive action is essential. At this COP, countries must renew their commitment to the previously set goals and set more ambitious targets with credible arrangements for transparency and accountability. However, actual progress in slowing down global warming, will come not just from what happens at the COP itself, but rather the concrete and ongoing implementation action that will actually be taken at the domestic level.

All countries including those in the Caribbean have a major stake in the global climate change negotiations and the outcome of this round of talks. But amongst those currently in the most precarious situation, are the Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) that are spread across the Caribbean, the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and elsewhere. They have unique and major concerns in this global climate crisis and in the negotiations.

Given their small size and lack of industrialization, they generate little of the greenhouse gases (GHGs) that are fuelling rising global temperatures, but are disproportionately impacted, and are already experiencing the brunt of climate change's negative consequences. These include extreme weather events, increasingly powerful hurricanes and cyclones, droughts and floods, sea level rise, water crises, biodiversity loss, and ecosystem collapse exposing them to the prospect of resultant food crises.

The delicate balance of their ecosystems and the fact that lives and livelihoods are closely entwined with the natural environment, renders them particularly susceptible to the costly disruption resulting from climate change.

Less headline grabbing than major natural disasters are the more gradual but steady and insidious changes to weather patterns that are affecting so many aspects of life in small islands. These include degeneration of agricultural production and of Government finances

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<sup>1</sup> The COP is the UNFCCC Convention's supreme decision-making body, on which all States that are Party are represented. The COP reviews the implementation of the Convention and other legal instruments and adopts and takes decisions necessary to promote its effective implementation.

resulting from the need to fund reconstruction after the natural disasters that more frequently devastate the whole country.

The situation facing small islands today prefigures the reality for the rest of the world in the coming years if latter continues generating GHGs at current rates.

If the vast forests like the Amazon can be characterised as the lungs of our planet, small islands should be viewed as its early warning system. They are like the canaries taken down coal mines in the olden days which succumbed to poisonous fumes, warning the miners of danger before they were even aware of it.

SIDS have always been active participants in the long global campaign aimed at curbing greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to climate change and many of them were among the first to subscribe to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which opened for signature at the Earth Summit in Rio in June 1992.

### What is needed?

Addressing the climate crisis requires immediate progress towards, reducing greenhouse gas emissions so as to slow down and halt rising global temperatures and building resilience and adapting to the climatic changes that are already taking place. The Paris Agreement of 2015 set out to achieve a carbon-neutral world by mid-century and agreed that temperature increase should not be allowed to exceed a maximum of 1.5 degrees Celsius (1.5°C), compared to pre-industrial levels. But existing commitments do not go far enough to permit achievement of these targets. More needs to be done by all countries.

SIDS will argue, and most justifiably so, that they already commit to proportionate reductions in their emissions. But, even if they are being severely and negatively impacted, SIDS are not the problem, their combined contribution to total global GHG emissions is tiny.

For the small islands, a major goal of the COP 27 Summit and more generally in the ongoing Climate negotiations is to get renewed commitment to and action on a viable global strategy for tackling climate change that entails substantial reductions to global emissions particularly by all the major emitters. For that greater ambition and bold and decisive action is needed. In Egypt, their challenge in pursuing their Climate aims and objectives is to secure broader international support. However, there is the considerable underlying impediment to progress in the negotiations; the lack of sufficient willingness of countries overall to undertake the investment, adjustments and transformation that would result in the required reduction of their generation of GHG emissions.

### Just Transition and Climate Justice

Transitioning to more sustainable economies from the current carbon intensive model, in order to slow down the rise in global temperatures, can raise questions of equity and fairness in the sharing of the burden of adjustment. The concerns can be deep-rooted and often stem from the fact that the impacts of climate change itself can differ across countries,

communities and groupings. For instance, SIDS are not major contributors to the greenhouse gases that are being generated, but they are disproportionately damaged by the consequences of global warming. Similarly, at the domestic level, vulnerable groups are often more adversely affected by climate change and less able to shield themselves from its adverse impacts. It is therefore essential that the burden of the transition process is equitably shared. This paper explores approaches to understanding the concept of justice and equity in transitioning and makes proposals for promoting it both at the domestic and international levels.

## The Imperative for a Collective Global Approach

The impact of climate change is global; but so are its causes. All countries are generating and releasing greenhouse gases (GHGs) into our planet's single atmosphere, so it is the sum of the actions of all of them that will determine the outcomes for the atmosphere and for temperatures, both at the global and evidently individual country levels.

If each country makes climate policy in isolation, it seems inevitable that immediate national interests and maybe even narrow political and economic expediency could take precedence over global concerns. Further, even if well intentioned, there is little likelihood that the sum of national policies devised in isolation would somehow constitute an optimal international package or roadmap for effectively tackling global Climate Change. Instead, coordination among all countries could offer a real possibility for juggling and reconciling the diverse national interests and positions. Collaboration is also needed, if the comprehensive, coherent and effective global policies, strategies, plans and actions needed for effectively addressing Climate Change are to be devised and agreed upon. Tackling the global crisis cannot be left to individual countries or governments but is a task for the whole world.

For achieving that goal, the United Nations mechanism, the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)<sup>2</sup> and the Conference of the Parties (COP), provide the only existing and credible structure with the authority and global negotiation capability. The logic of a multilateral rather than a national strategic approach is compelling. If the world is to make progress and take collective action to tackle Climate Change, the time is now, at COP27.

The UN provides a credible structure with global negotiation capability at the inter-governmental level. Of course, it can, with justification, be argued that other stakeholders, business, Civil Society, labour, academia are excluded from the negotiations, given that they are being conducted within the UN framework. Also worrying is that the current dynamics of such multilateral negotiations, work to the disadvantage of SIDS. This is in part because the relative power of countries and the extent of the financial and human resources supporting their national negotiators, have a significant impact on outcomes. SIDS however face severe

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<sup>2</sup> The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) entered into force on 21st March 1994 and currently has 197 countries as members.



financial and capacity constraints and lack of the political and economic power that provides undoubted leverage in international negotiations. They therefore are not able to have the influence over outcomes that is warranted by the urgency of the climate threat that they face.

It is true that articulate and powerful interventions of individual SIDS negotiators have been effective and permitted them, on occasion, to “punch above their weight”, but overall, such influence is the exception, not the norm.

Nonetheless, despite its serious limitations, the UNFCCC is the only institutionalised structure which provides a credible framework for climate consultations and negotiations among all governments and the coordination of action. Whilst SIDS must seek reforms to help ensure that their voices, interests and needs are better taken into account and addressed, the immediate task for COP27 is to get the world to progress with urgent action for tackling Climate Change.

- *“Today more than ever, life must be characterised by a sense of universal responsibility” Dalai Lama*
- *“If working apart we are a force powerful to destabilise our planet, surely working together we are powerful enough to save it”. David Attenborough, Climate activist*
- *“We are all living together on a single planet, which is threatened by our own actions. And if you don’t have some kind of global cooperation, nationalism is just not on the right level to tackle the problems.” Yuval Noah Harari, Historian*

## Current Global Situation

Regrettably, the current global situation is not favourable for securing the greater commitment and agreement on decisive action that is needed. The COVID 19 pandemic adversely affected all economies and most countries have not yet recovered from its devastating economic impact. This has meant that their latitude to invest and take financial measures needed to adapt and transform has been narrowed. Then, the ongoing Ukraine War has precipitated great uncertainty in the natural gas market that may now seriously affect the willingness of countries, particularly in Europe to honour and upgrade their pledges to cut back on the use of coal.

The overall political context is not propitious either. In addition to the war in Europe, competition has been intensifying between the USA and China and Russia and NATO allies. Compounding these challenges has been the steady retreat from multilateralism in recent years, with powerful countries preferring unilateral approaches to addressing problems; even those of an international or global character.

The unfortunate reality is that international and domestic political and economic considerations exert inordinate influence on the direction and pace of progress of climate negotiations since they help shape the context in which they are conducted.



Whilst economic and other relevant considerations need to be taken into account, safeguarding them in the short-term cannot be permitted to impede tackling the climate crisis, which on its current trajectory, will eventually lead to economic disaster for the whole world. Therefore, it would be cynical and unreasonable to hold the pursuit and attainment of global climate goals and the safeguarding of our planet hostage to perceived narrow national self-interest or international disputes.

Tackling the climate crisis must not be derailed by considerations of economic expediency or short-term advantage, neither should it be treated as a pawn, either in domestic partisan politics or the strategic competition among great powers.

*"If you really think that the environment is less important than the economy, try holding your breath while you count your money."* Guy McPherson, American scientist,

## SIDS in the Global Campaign

Caribbean and other SIDS have long been at the forefront of the global campaign to combat climate change by getting reductions in the emissions of greenhouse gases. Many of them were among the first to subscribe to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which opened for signature at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. They, like other SIDS, were instrumental to the successful negotiation at the Paris COP in 2015 of the international agreement to achieve a carbon-neutral world by mid-century and the commitment to limit global temperature increase to a maximum of 1.5 degrees celsius, above pre-industrial levels.

Because they are disproportionately impacted by climate change, SIDS have a major stake in the progress of the global negotiations. Whilst they generate little of the greenhouse gases that are fuelling rising temperatures; they are more victims than perpetrators.

### SIDS' collective approach

There can be little doubt that coordination among all countries offers the only real possibility for devising and agreeing upon the comprehensive, coherent and effective global policies, strategies, plans and actions needed for addressing Climate Change, which is already having such a negative impact on them. The collective approach is absolutely essential. As Gordon Brown, former UK Prime Minister put it *"We cannot compromise with the earth; we cannot compromise with the catastrophe of unchecked climate change, so we must compromise with one another"*.

The reality is that the UNFCCC and the COP, are currently the only existing and credible structures with the required authority and capability to conduct these global climate negotiations.

The UNFCCC has been successful in informing global public opinion of the reality and existential threats of Climate Change and of the necessity for action. However, some SIDS officials have privately voiced concerns over systemic characteristics and failings that compromise the ability of the arrangements to achieve their required aims. Among other things, they cite the agenda and programme becoming too extensive and complex. They suggest that the process itself is now so massive and burdensome that it compromises the effectiveness and the ability of small countries to participate fully.

The other concern is the lack of genuine inclusiveness. Despite sometimes punching above their weight Small States with their limited resources and small delegations are not able to participate as adequately and represent their positions as the well-manned, developed country delegations.

The non-inclusion of key stakeholders in the talks is another weakness. Although it is governments, who as members of the UN and conduct the UNFCCC negotiations, the threats being addressed are of fundamental concern to all of humanity and to the future of our world itself. Given the enormity and seriousness of this responsibility, more structured and effective involvement by civil society in deliberations would be needed at the domestic and international levels, whilst of course recognising the intergovernmental character of the process.

At the end of the summit held in Glasgow last November, SIDS and other delegations acknowledged that the sum of national commitments to reduce GHG emissions made so far by countries, did not go far enough to permit achievement of the targets. Therefore, even if the commitments of all countries were met, global warming would far exceed the 1.5°C limit above pre-industrial temperatures.

*“There needs to be urgent and concrete action by the major economies to reduce their emissions of carbon dioxide to a level consistent with a 1.5°C pathway. As it stands, the pledges and targets on the table will get us to somewhere around 2.1°C which will be catastrophic for SIDS. However, if we look at the “walk”, as opposed to the “talk”, that is the policies in place and the actions being pursued, the situation is even more grim; we will land somewhere closer to 3°C”* Dr James Fletcher, former Minister of Sustainable Development St. Lucia

### Approach to negotiations

Like many other Parties, small islands generally negotiate at COP with the support of alliances and link up with, or are part of, more than one group whether just on a specific issue or to pursue broader shared interests. Preparing for and negotiating along with allies, rather than in isolation, enhances the prospects for success. There is evident value in having other countries also advance and argue in favour of the same position subscribed to by the small

island. But there is an additional benefit. This device compensates for a crucial shortcoming; the inability of the individual SIDS to consistently mount adequate and effective presence and participation in all the required negotiating sessions.

Small islands invariably possess limited capacity for conducting complex and demanding multilateral negotiations, often they are even unable to fund and field teams to attend, far less effectively participate in all preparatory sessions and negotiating meetings. Because they sometimes are not able to join the numerous and often overlapping meetings, they therefore sometimes are not present when decisions that might affect or even bind them are being taken. To counter this problem, their strategy has been to work with allies and in coalitions. These are joined because the small island expects the allies and members to advance the same positions that they themselves would have been advocating. This permits the SIDS' shared interests and objectives to be served; albeit by other parties, even if its representatives are not physically in the meeting room.

As leaders of Caribbean governments, along with those of all countries meet in Egypt for the, the annual UN sponsored climate summit, but will they be able to achieve the outcomes that are so desperately needed to safeguard our interests, avert climate disaster and support a just transition.

At the end of the Climate summit held in Glasgow in November 2021, SIDS acknowledged that the sum of national commitments to reduce greenhouse gases made so far by countries, did not go far enough to permit achievement of the agreed targets. Also, the financial support from industrialized and developed countries that they require for building their resilience and adapting to climatic changes was not forthcoming. Neither was there agreement, even in principle, of the necessity to compensate small countries for the loss and damage that they suffer from Climate Change that is caused by others.

The challenge for the Caribbean and other SIDS is to decide what they should seek to achieve; whose views and inputs they canvass; and how they might go about securing broader international support for their Climate aims.

## Advancing the SIDS Agenda at COP27 and Beyond

For SIDS to secure the action from the international community that would help push their agenda forward at COP27 and beyond they evidently need to get other countries to agree. However, whilst the framework for actual policy setting and decision making is the UNFCCC and its COP, much more would be needed than the mere presentation and promoting of their positions at “showpiece” negotiating sessions.

With future of humankind and of our planet under threat, one could hope that all countries and major stakeholders would get together, collaborating in a non-confrontational manner to devise optimal policies, strategies and mechanisms that would lead to the slowing down of global warming. But this would not be the style in our divided world. Instead, the conventional approach is being pursued for securing international agreement through structured and

exclusive intergovernmental negotiations that tend to be more adversarial than collaborative. This despite the uniqueness of the objective; in this case averting a grave danger threatening all countries, our world and our common future. With this approach being pursued, it is no wonder that such little progress has been made.

Compounding this difficulty in recent years, there has been a decline in support for the multilateral approach to resolving issues in favour of unilateral approaches.

*“The major challenge here ... is the absence of binding global commitments to achieve and maintain a 1.5°C target. The current arrangements are far too loose and voluntary for an existential threat such as this”.* Cletus Springer former Director, Department of Sustainable Development, Organization of American States

This is the unfortunate context within which the negotiations are being conducted and SIDS pursue their aims. But as very small states, they face additional constraints to their ability to change the positions of other countries with whom they are engaged in inter-state negotiations. The reason is their shortage of human and financial capacity and most importantly of power, whether economic, military or political. Power and capacity are vital enablers of success in international negotiations.

Despite their severe constraints, SIDS have been effective in various multilateral negotiations, often punching above their weight. They can and have had most success when they leverage the unique combinations of powers that they possess, their numbers, the moral authority of their positions, their determination and the frequent individual skill and courage of their negotiators. An excellent example of this was COP15 in Paris. There, SIDS negotiators played an instrumental and decisive role in ensuring that the 1.5°C upper limit was agreed upon.

## Tactical approaches to negotiations and outreach

### Internal solidarity

SIDS can harness and capitalise on their greatest asset, their numbers, which gives them valuable influence and leverage. However, for that value to be realised, it is essential that all member States commit to and consistently and forcefully articulate agreed common positions. In order to ensure commitment, the views of all members including the smallest, must be taken into consideration and appropriately reconciled. The final product must be seen by all of them as valuable and in line with their national goals and interests. The methodology for arriving at the common positions must therefore be inclusive.

### Coherence of positions

In order to have influence SIDS must be listened to and taken seriously, but for that, they must first attract attention. This can be achieved by having a clear and readily understood message that is powerfully and consistently articulated by a large number of countries. This

will not only be in the context of the actual negotiations but aimed at enlisting public international support

Their messaging must be focussed on the Climate crisis; be clear and be coherent.

SIDS have a vast range of urgent concerns, not all of which are in the realm of climate change. These will influence or be tackled in the actual negotiations, adding to their complexity. But in their public campaign, it is essential that SIDS are clear on their fundamental aims. In addition, they should avoid the temptation of seeking, via the medium of the climate negotiations, to pursue other objectives for which alternative and more appropriate mechanisms already exist.

Further, representatives from a large number of different countries are unlikely to consistently and credibly articulate a range convoluted ideas and aims. (Of course, speaking notes can be centrally prepared and distributed but the originally phrased and sometimes *ex tempore* statements by Ministers and other representatives can be more effective).

*“The UNFCCC process should be one where all parties have only one goal – protecting life on the planet as we know it”.* Dr James Fletcher

### Enlisting public international support

Changing public opinion is having a decisive impact on the shaping of climate policy in many countries and hence the negotiating stances of their governments and representatives. Concerns regarding the future are being most strongly articulated by the youth, who are motivated and mobilised because they recognise that their futures and that of the whole world are in growing jeopardy. They therefore can be a principal ally and promoter of SIDS climate aims.

Also to be targeted are the influential civil society groupings, businesses, NGOs, local governments, academia, trade unions among others. Many of them are well-resourced and have influence on their national government’s policy as well as global public opinion that would often be greater than that of SIDS, whether individually or collectively.

The fundamental message of SIDS, that more needs to be done to bring about a slowing down of rising global temperatures, is in line with the aims of many of these groupings. Therefore, on that and related issues they can be natural allies, enabling SIDS to leverage their outreach and influence to promote shared objectives.

SIDS need to be open to and reach out to supportive groupings wherever they exist, within the region and beyond including in the developed countries.

### Cultivating beneficial pragmatic inter-state alliances

Having the right allies among other countries and groups of countries is important. SIDS need to be unsentimental in their selection. Their first position should be to seek out and engage

in coalitions and with allies on specific issues on which they have a common position/s. Nonetheless, it is quite acceptable and indeed essential that on other issues on which there is divergence, they maintain and firmly articulate the SIDS positions.

Of course, should there be complete congruence of positions with another country or grouping, then SIDS could have a comprehensive alliance.

It is important that decisions on the selection of allies, is determined by shared positions or objectives in the Climate negotiations themselves, rather than in any other consideration.

AOSIS with its 39 members can be an attractive ally in the negotiations if other countries view it as operating coherently with members who are active, outspoken and reliable.

Alliances and coalitions have and continue to greatly assist Caribbean SIDS in advancing their aims and objectives in the negotiations but their resources and negotiating capital are scarce, so they cannot afford to be sentimental. Therefore, should the expected result from a relationship/s not actually materialise or be reversed, then continuation should be reconsidered.

## Previous Expectations of SIDS: COP26

After two years of delay, with the Covid-19 pandemic still very much a live issue and compounding hazards during the hurricane and cyclone seasons, the circumstances under which the small islands participated at COP26 were extremely difficult. The representation of delegations at the COP was certainly not equitable and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and SIDS civil society were faced with increasing challenges to be represented and heard in the negotiating rooms. This included the challenges of obtaining visas, meeting the extravagant costs of attending COP26 and when at the COP, long delays in being able to even enter the venue and then, for delegates to even get a seat at the negotiating table.

[AOSIS' leaders' declaration](#) of 2021 presented a road map of what the expectations were for COP26. Unfortunately, these expectations were largely left unmet as shown below:

Delivered	
<p><b>Implementation of the Paris Agreement:</b> For the full implementation of the Paris Agreement the Katowice Rulebook which details the implementation guidelines of the Agreement needed to be finalized at COP26.</p>	<p>COP26 delivered on the rulebook conclusion on outstanding items for the implementation of the Paris Agreement including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An enhanced transparency framework for reporting emissions;</li> <li>• Common timeframes for emissions reductions targets;</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mechanisms and standards for international carbon markets.</li> </ul>
<b>Inadequate or no progress</b>	
<p><b>Greater Ambition from Major Emitters:</b> All actions, including finance flows, Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), Long Term Strategies (LTS), and Covid-19 recovery, need to be 1.5°C aligned.</p>	<p>The Glasgow Pact recognised the need for urgency - resolved to limit warming to 1.5°C and urged Parties to enhance their NDCs to align with the temperature goal. To facilitate the Glasgow Pact, countries decided “to establish a work programme to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade” to be delivered by CMA4.</p>
<p><b>Delivery of the \$100 Billion:</b></p> <p>Delivery of the \$100 Billion: A critical element for implementation is the delivery of adequate, predictable and accessible financing for mitigation and adaptation. This sum of a \$100 bn is clearly not adequate to meet the scale of the challenge that lies ahead for developing countries. The V20 grouping demanded a joint ‘Delivery Plan’ from developed nations to concretely demonstrate how the \$100 billion in annual climate finance will be met over the 5-year period from 2020 to 2024 with a total minimum of \$500 billion of climate finance provided.” The V20 also urged developed countries to allocate public international climate finance to be 50% adaptation compatible.</p>	<p><a href="#">The Glasgow Pact</a> “Notes with deep regret that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation has not yet been met...; Urges developed country Parties to fully deliver on the USD 100 billion goal urgently and through to 2025</p>
<p><b>Loss and Damage:</b> The priority was to decide in establishing a finance facility to address Loss and Damage and to operationalise the Santiago Network</p>	<p>In the spirit of compromise, Parties decided in the Glasgow Dialogue on Loss and Damage which AOSIS made clear has the purpose of establishing the Finance Facility by COP27. The Santiago Network was unable to be operationalised with Parties unable to agree on its modalities.</p>



Processes commenced	
<p><b>New Financing and other matters:</b> <b>Commencing</b> formal negotiations at COP26 on the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG). This would entail from a financing floor of US\$100 billion, with a view to effectively support climate action in developing countries in the transition to 1.5oC. It would also and align finance flows with a pathway towards low greenhouse gases emissions and climate-resilient development.</p>	<p>At COP26 Parties initiated the deliberations on the NCQG with the establishment of an Ad hoc work programme</p>
<p><b>Adaptation Agenda 2030:</b> Prioritize efforts to deliver on the Adaptation Action Agenda 2030 for a Decade of Action with the promotion of practical adaptation solutions to ensure regional development progress stays on track for the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, and that nobody will be left behind come 2030.</p>	<p>A two-year Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh (GlaSS) work programme on the global goal on adaptation (2022-2023)</p>

*“The negotiating process appears to have taken on a life of its own, where the focus seems to be more on going through the motions of negotiations and keeping the process alive than on making serious progress, at the very least the type of progress that is required to ensure a less perilous future for SIDS and other climate vulnerable countries”.* Dr James Fletcher, former Minister of Sustainable Development St. Lucia

## Urgency of the Science

The IPCC 6th Assessment (AR6) Working Group (WG) or [AR6 WGII](#) on Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability has shown that the magnitude impacts are far larger than previously estimated:

- The hard limits to adaptation are being reached meaning that no further adaptation is possible.


- Furthermore, the soft limits to adaptation, those currently not available but that might become available in the future, are also being reached but these can be overcome by addressing “a range of constraints, primarily financial, governance, institutional and policy constraints.”
- Overshooting 1.5°C would result in irreversible negative consequences. Analysis from the [WMO](#) shows that we are at risk of breaching 1.5°C in the next few years.
- The quality of actions matter - relying on unproven technologies to reverse or mask overshoot may prove ineffective and risk worsening issues.
- Climate justice, rights, equity, and the centrality of indigenous and local knowledge are integral to effectively responding to climate change.

The [IPCC's WG III](#) report shows that there is a substantial gap in mitigation and implementation still remaining with the implementation of nationally determined contributions (NDCs) announced prior to COP26 likely leading to warming exceeding 1.5°C this century. The report also shows that policies implemented by the end of 2020 are projected to result in higher global GHG emissions than those implied by NDCs.

In the [IPCC's Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C](#), the impact for SIDS is already significant. The report states that regions at disproportionately higher risk at this temperature include Arctic ecosystems, dryland regions, small island developing states, and least developed countries. This includes the consequences of sea-level rise such as saltwater intrusion, coastal erosion, to more frequent and severe weather events. For islanders who are so integrally linked to the marine ecosystems that surround them for culture and economy, the report shows that even at 1.5°C, 70 to 90% of coral reefs will be lost and this increases to 99% at 2°C.

#### **SPM Figure 4**

Projected global GHG emissions from NDCs announced prior to COP26 would make it likely that warming will exceed 1.5°C and also make it harder after 2030 to limit warming to below 2°C.



*"The future will be green or not at all."* Sir Jonathon Porritt, Environmentalist and politician

## What needs to happen at COP27

- COP27 must broadly step up and deliver on urgency and deliver on promises. The failure of developed countries in enacting their fair shares of mitigation action has increased the need for adaptation and increased the cost of Loss and Damage as the hard limits of adaptation are being met.

COP26 recognised that ambition in NDCs is not aligned to the ambition needed to remain within the bounds of the long-term temperature goal. The Glasgow Climate Pact:

- Decided to establish a **'work programme to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation'** (MWP) in this critical decade and requested the Subsidiary Bodies to recommend a draft decision for consideration and adoption by CMA4, in a manner that complements the global stocktake.
- Decided to convene an annual high-level ministerial round table on pre-2030 ambition**, beginning at CMA4.

- **Urged Parties who had not done so yet to communicate their enhanced NDCs by CMA4.**
- **Requested Parties to revisit and strengthen the 2030 targets in their NDCs as necessary to align with the temperature goal by the end of 2022.**

To meet the scale of urgency and to ensure we stay within the vital target of 1.5°C, emissions must immediately reach their peak and then be cut in half by 2030. This can only be achieved via just, equitable, and rights oriented deep systems and sector wide transformation which must be supported by a significant upscale in finance. [According to the most recent Needs Determination Report from the Standing Committee on Finance \(SCF\)](#), and based on 78 NDCs, developing nations will require at least USD 5.8 - 5.9 trillion cumulatively in climate finance to reach their individual NDC commitments for adaptation and mitigation by 2030. This is likely an underestimate and does not include the costs of addressing Loss and Damage.

The MWP is a critical deliverable for COP27. The negotiations for the MWP commenced in June 2022 during the Subsidiary Body meetings, SB56 in Bonn. Unfortunately, the negotiations failed to make substantive progress. Parties could not agree to take note of the informal note produced by the co-facilitators. The note, which could have been a useful starting point for upcoming discussions collated all options presented in the course of the negotiations whilst in no way prejudging, implying consensus or having any formal status. Major areas of disagreement included language on major emitters versus historically major emitters which would risk reopening the Convention and its Paris Agreement, on whether there was need for intersessional work, the time period of the MWP, and duplication with the Global Stocktake (GST).

### Ambition

In summary COP27 must respond to the urgency of the science. To do so, it cannot repeat the lack of progress at SB56 on the MWP. It therefore must:

- **Define and deliver an ambitious, equitable MWP.** AOSIS can play a critical role in supporting the direction of travel with the moral authority it has continually displayed in this multilateral process.

To achieve this, the key messages to deliver are:

- The goal of the MWP should be to urgently increase the ambition and execution of Parties' efforts to achieve global aggregate emissions reductions of at least 43% [34-60%] by 2030 relative to 2019 levels, in order to be consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C. This is in line with the latest IPCC recommendations.
- The MWP must complement the global stocktake (GST) and be based on equity and fair shares, which is enshrined as the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibility and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) in the Convention and its Paris Agreement.

- A comprehensive transformation of all sectors is required. The MWP should serve as an accountability and check-in mechanism for Parties' voluntary sectoral commitments.
- It should be political in the sense that successive ministerial roundtables, as mandated by the Glasgow Climate Pact, are influenced by the technical work of the Work Programme, allowing a political check-in on strengthening and revising NDCs and implementation.
- It should improve the execution of the Parties' sectoral decarbonization commitments, such as those made under the Glasgow Climate Pact (which cover coal, oil, and gas, all fossil fuel subsidies, clean power generation, energy efficiency, industry, protecting and restoring ecosystems, and methane), as well as plurilateral initiatives for just sectoral decarbonization.
- Enhance the role and accountability of Non-Parties Stakeholders towards raising 2030 ambition and implementation by strengthening NPS engagement with Parties.

2. In addition to a robust MWP, COP27 must deliver on the mandates from COP26 with ambition in line with 1.5C reflected in enhanced NDCs

Since the call from COP26 only 19 countries, as of September 2022, have submitted enhanced NDCs. Not all can be considered as improvements (for instance Brazil). COP27 must remind Parties that they should confirm existing NDCs are in line with the IPCC's most recent scientific recommendations and are also in line with their long term strategies (LTS). Additionally, Parties should be reminded that consecutive NDCs should indicate a progression, should reflect its maximum possible ambition, and can be updated at any moment per the Paris Agreement.

Progressive NDCs such as that of Vanuatu's and other SIDS ought to be commended and highlighted as best practice to create a race to the top for better, more ambitious NDCs.

### Adaptation

Support for adaptation is a priority for Africa, the Asia Pacific region and for the COP27 Presidency, the political moment to deliver on adaptation is ripe.

The strategic priorities are on the Global Goal on Adaptation and Adaptation Finance.

What needs to happen at COP27?

- [The Glasgow Sharm-el-Sheik Work Programme on the Global Goal on Adaptation \(GlaSS\)](#) will need to ensure that adaptation is in the political agenda with items at COP27 and COP28 and at the Subsidiary Body (SB) meetings to ensure the delivery of substantive outcomes on adaptation with a permanent agenda item on Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA).

- On Adaptation finance, AOSIS can support the ask of likeminded blocs such as the Africa Group of Negotiators for a transparent implementation plan and time-bound tracking showing progress towards the 2025 doubling target, as well as demonstrating the flow of funds to country-led programs. The significant concerns on the accounting of adaptation finance and the inequity in the instruments (loans over grants) need to be acknowledged and addressed at COP27.

*“Increased focus must be placed on technology transfer to allow developing countries to adapt existing technologies to suit their own special circumstances and also to have the ability to develop home-grown solutions to their problems.”* Dr James Fletcher, former Minister of Sustainable Development St. Lucia

## Loss and Damage

At COP26, the G77 and China backed by AOSIS proposed the delivery of a finance facility to address Loss and Damage. The compromise of the Glasgow Dialogue for Loss and Damage was instead reached. AOSIS made it clear that it was their understanding that the aim of this Dialogue was to consultatively define the facility and make a recommendation to COP27. The first Dialogue took place during the Subsidiary Bodies meeting in Bonn in June 2022. G77 and China, [AOSIS](#) and other developing nation blocs made it plain that progress was insufficient. The Dialogue provided no real direction for moving further in terms of providing funding to remedy Loss and Damage.

### What needs to happen at COP27 regarding Loss and Damage?

There are two very clear objectives for COP27:

1. Get Loss and Damage on the Agenda
2. Deliver a Loss and Damage Finance Facility

### Agenda Item 1- Get Loss and Damage on the Agenda

It is imperative that Loss and Damage is on the agenda. As it stands it is provisionally in the agenda as “Matters relating to funding arrangements for addressing loss and damage” as a sub-item of “Matters relating to finance”. This item, proposed by G77 and China would facilitate a discussion on the wider narrative of loss and damage as the third pillar of climate finance whilst offering a direct route through which to conclude a decision on the establishment of a Loss and Damage finance facility. It is the key first step for COP27 to pass.

### Agenda Item 2- Loss and Damage Finance Facility Established

AOSIS has been seeking finance to address Loss and Damage for the last three decades. Whilst Loss and Damage is experienced globally (as evidenced by wildfires and flooding in the US and EU) it is the most vulnerable, with limited capacity to respond, that are impacted the most. We see this very recently in Pakistan where 33 million people have been impacted by

devastating floods. SIDS now experience new disasters which strike, even as they are still recovering from the last. The burden keeps falling back on the communities as the scale of finance to respond to these disasters and its aftermath are not fit for purpose.

There is currently no finance to address loss and damage in the climate finance architecture and it is not separately recognised within multilateral climate change funds, bilateral climate finance support or by the multilateral development banks (MDBs). There are already serious concerns with accounting of climate finance flows and bilateral budget support upholding and entrenching conditional and dated models of ODA. Addressing Loss and Damage is a solidarity-based reaction to historical and ongoing injustice and therefore must not be conflated with additional and complementary forms of support.

### What Could a Loss and Damage Finance Facility Look Like?

[A paper by Climate Action Network and Allies shows what a facility could look like.](#) Whilst the nomenclature of fund and facility can be discussed, the assumption here is that they refer to the same ideal of a standalone pot to address Loss and Damage. The paper shows that the Loss and Damage finance facility should make a significant and ambitious contribution to combat climate change by focusing exclusively on addressing Loss and Damage, becoming the third financing pillar of the Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC which also serves the Paris Agreement. As an operating entity of the Financial Mechanism, it should be accountable to the COP and CMA as well as the WIM and function under their guidance to support projects, programmes, policies, planning, coordination and other activities to address Loss and Damage in developing countries.

As both a coordination and financing mechanism, it should be the primary vehicle to coordinate, mobilise and channel new, additional, adequate and predictable financial resources to address Loss and Damage for developing countries and affected communities and people driven by country- and in particular local-level ownership. It should be capable of receiving and administering financial inputs on an ongoing basis from a variety of public, private, as well as innovative/ alternative sources. The facility could offer direct budget support. Channelling finance through the facility for direct budget support would be aligned with a justice-oriented approach.

The funds for the facility are already available and should be based on the polluter-pays principle as has been supported by the [Special rapporteur on Climate Change](#) and by the [UN Secretary General](#) whose address at the 77th session of the General Assembly called “ *on all developed economies to tax the windfall profits of fossil fuel companies. [and] Those funds should be redirected in two ways: to countries suffering loss and damage caused by the climate crisis; and to people struggling with rising food and energy prices.*”



## Towards a Just Transition

The need for rapid transition from carbon intensive to more sustainable economies is imperative if the climate crisis is to be addressed. However, the costs and benefits are not always equitably shared, whether at the international or the domestic level. Some might gain whilst others lose, particularly those least able to adapt.

Whilst seeking to maximise the benefits of climate action and transitioning from high-carbon activities to a green economy, there is the need to minimise undue harm to workers, at-risk sectors, communities, regions and vulnerable countries. Also, that the costs of adaptation are not disproportionately borne by those less able to cope, but that burden sharing, among stakeholders and indeed across generations, is equitable.

Despite the undeniable desirability of green transitioning, there can be potential dangers and foreseeable risks for certain groups of workers, such as those in the fossil fuel industry, where the demand for their products or services could be depressed in the transition. This recognition might well have helped prompt the International Labour Organization (ILO), to draw up its "*Guidelines for a just transition towards environmentally sustainable economies and societies for all*". These were affirmed by the 2015 Paris Agreement and the principles have steadily been evolving and gaining international acceptance. Then the COP 24 in Poland in 2018, adopted the Solidarity and Just Transition Silesia Declaration, highlighting the importance of just transition. A further boost came from a COP26 Declaration encouraging the inclusion of "Just transitioning" when drafting and implementing nationally determined contributions (NDCs).

### What is a Just Transition?

But what does Just Transition stand for? The concept introduces new considerations of equity to guide countries as they move from fossil fuel-based economies to equitable, regenerative, renewable energy-based systems. It now incorporates broader social, economic and political concerns of the wider society. Essentially the interests of all stakeholders and groups must be considered and, as appropriate, be fairly taken into account in setting goals and objectives, making and implementing policy. In addition, the costs and benefits of the adaptation measures are equitably spread.

While maximising the benefits of climate action, it is necessary to seek to ensure that harm to workers, communities, countries, and regions is avoided or minimised. Particular attention needs to be paid to disadvantaged groups that are disproportionately impacted by climate change because of their greater exposure to its harmful effects. For instance, the poor might not be able to afford to build storm-proof housing, making them more susceptible to destruction during hurricanes. Also, they could be obliged to live in more dangerous locations like floodplains or steep landslide-prone hillsides. They are therefore exposed to a greater risk from flooding and landslides triggered by extreme weather events that are becoming more common due to climate change. They are likely therefore to need greater assistance to

recover and to adapt. Compounding their vulnerability, disadvantaged groups, particularly the poor are often unable to afford insurance to protect themselves.

When Hurricane Mathew tore through the Caribbean and North America in 2016 killing 584 people, 548 were in Haiti where 1.4 million people were left needing assistance of whom 175,000 were made homeless.

[Recent research findings](#) which examined green energy transition outcomes across SIDS, reinforced the importance of recognising the critical differences that hinder or enable a green transition within developing versus developed countries or high-income versus low-income contexts. Findings further caution against a 'one size fits all approach' to just transition across developing regions. The core nuances between developing regions must also be understood and considered across varying developing contexts. The needs required to facilitate a just and equitable transition rely on efforts to better map how varying contexts impact the effectiveness of strategies designed and deployed, including who are the key actors within respective contexts needed to ensure a transition that benefits the many rather than just a few.

Equity and fairness in burden sharing is not only a concern among different groupings in society and across countries, but also across generations. Whilst GHG emissions today adversely affect the environment if they continue to increase, they will impose additional and arguably unjust burdens on future generations.

### Ensuring Fairness

For transition to be just, the following are necessary features:

1. The interests and concerns of all stakeholders must be considered and as necessary, taken into account in setting goals and objectives, policy making and implementation.
2. Those that need help receive it
3. Solutions do not unfairly burden those less able to withstand their cost.
4. All stakeholders are fully involved in and take ownership of the process, it must not be externally imposed.

The aims of a just and equitable transition would be applicable across generations and at both the international and national levels. But the methodology for achieving that aim would vary.

*"This is all wrong.... People are suffering. People are dying. Entire ecosystems are collapsing. ... And all you can talk about is money and fairytales of eternal economic growth. How dare you! ...You are failing us... But the young people are starting to understand your betrayal. The eyes of all future generations are upon you. And if you choose to fail us, I say: We will never forgive you."* Greta Thunberg Climate Activist

## International level

For transition tackling climate change at the international level to be just and equitable, there needs to be full and effective participation of all countries in policy setting and negotiations so that their interests and concerns are genuinely taken into account. Particular attention needs to be paid to the smallest and weakest members of the international community, whose role and influence, particularly outside of the flagship Ministerial sessions, is often marginal. The burden of transition needs to be spread fairly with adequate support provided to those less able to bear its costs, particularly when they are victims rather than significant contributors to the climate crisis.

A real challenge for most SIDS is how to meaningfully advance their positions and interests in the UNFCCC negotiations when they lack the human and financial resources to participate adequately. In fact, most of them do not even have a permanent physical presence in Bonn, the seat of the UNFCCC. The undermanned and under resourced SIDS' delegations cannot attend the myriad of vital technical and other sessions. In the main, they can only afford to show up for the headline events, like COP.

By contrast larger countries generally have well equipped and fully staffed delegations that can effectively and consistently advance their national positions. In such circumstances, it is inevitable that the outcomes of the process will be imbalanced, disproportionately reflecting their positions and interests as opposed to those of the smaller and weaker countries. This means, that in effect agreements reached on policy and action can be determined by more than the objective merit of the issues, but also the relative power and the strength in the negotiations, of the larger and more powerful countries.

This imbalance causes results to be skewed and result in outcomes that are sub-optimal. The unacceptability of such a situation needs to be acknowledged and compensatory arrangements introduced to enable more equal participation and to ensure that the interests of SIDS are taken into consideration and are properly reflected in negotiating outcomes.

The other requirement for a just transition across countries relates to burden-sharing.

Climate change, which is the consequence of decades of exploitation of the environment by industrialised countries, has been having a devastating impact on vulnerable small islands even if their contribution to the problem is miniscule. Whilst there probably is little that can be done to change this seemingly perverse situation, some arrangements are possible for restorative justice.

SIDS should be compensated financially, by the industrialised countries that bear the brunt of the responsibility for the crisis. A "Loss & Damage Finance Facility" that would provide assured, adequate and timely compensation to SIDS for the additional costs that they have to bear, which is the of the climate change.

In addition, a separate facility would be needed to help small islands adapt to ongoing climate change; build their resilience and transition their economies. Pursuing these objectives is

essential of course but the Caribbean and most other SIDS lack the domestic financial resources that are required for this massive task. Therefore, they need outside help, particularly from those principally responsible, since the industrialisation, economic growth and rising incomes in those countries, were in part being paid for by SIDS who are innocent and vulnerable bystanders.

*“It cannot be fair for developed countries to renege on both their commitments to curb greenhouse gas emissions and provide climate finance to vulnerable countries, without their being some sort of sanction on the part of the UNFCCC.”* Dr James Fletcher, former Minister of Sustainable Development St. Lucia

### Domestic level

For equity at the national level, the interests of all relevant groupings and communities must be reconciled with fair distribution of costs and benefits. Mechanisms are needed to enable consultations with the Government that are effective, regular, timely and non-partisan.

The following considerations that would help enable a just transition are outlined:

- **The inclusion** as appropriate, of all stakeholders and representatives of relevant communities, business, agriculture, fishing, civil society, academia, local authorities, women, youth, low-income households, etc. This will help ensure that their interests and perspectives can be taken into account particularly in the setting of climate objectives for mitigation and adaptation. Understanding their views, informs policy making which would be enriched by the incorporation as appropriate of the interests of these groups. It also means that they are likely to feel a sense of ownership and probably be more committed to implementation.
- **The role of Government** is critical. It needs to establish and effectively manage a consultative and advisory mechanism for engagement on a non-partisan basis with all relevant stakeholders. Several Caribbean countries already have Climate consultation groups. Whatever the structure, its operations need to demonstrate the following features:
- **Good-faith engagement** with participants. They need adequate, regular, and timely information on national climate policy and actions if they are to be able to have the genuine oversight and understanding that would enable them to make the intended meaningful contribution to policy development and implementation. Government must, to the extent appropriate, provide meaningful updates on relevant developments. Recognising of course that national policy is the responsibility of Government, the proposals and recommendations that the consultative group makes should nonetheless be considered seriously since they can help inform and contribute to better climate policy formulation and action and to the framing of optimal international negotiating positions.

- **The responsibility of participating stakeholder representatives:** Whilst the initiative and the bulk of the information provided might come from the Government, the groups and their representatives must play an active and informed role if they are to meaningfully contribute to climate policy and its implementation. Each group's representative must have an understanding of the issues and of the interests of their groups or communities to whom they must be fully accountable.
- **Preparation is critical.** The participating organisations must be well prepared, with a clear understanding of the impact of climate change on its members as well as its mitigation and adaptation needs. The positions put forward should be endorsed in advance by the membership and constitute the guiding brief for the Representative. He/she does not participate as an independent expert but as the voice and ears of the wider membership, who faithfully articulates their views and reports back to them.

The consultative mechanism can be general; in which representatives of the government meet with stakeholders or selectively with one or a limited number of representatives addressing a specific policy or implementation concern.

One would expect the representative to articulate the expectations for fair treatment of their group or community. Therefore, this mechanism gives government access to the well informed and possibly diverging views and interests of stakeholder groups and communities. It can now consider, balance and incorporate them into its overall national level climate and mitigation and adaptation policies and actions that are fair and equitable.

A workable climate consultative mechanism for reflecting and accommodating the views and interests of all stakeholders in national policy and action, is an essential prerequisite for a just and equitable transition. However, it is no more than an enabling framework. To be effective, both the government and the participating organisations and representatives have a responsibility to play their part as set out above and make the consultation work.

Such a full, meaningful, and intimate consultative role for civil society in national policy setting and implementation might of course not be the norm. But in this case the involvement and reconciliation of all national interests actually strengthens the hand of negotiators, because they can be confident that the positions that they advocate, have full national support and buy-in.

*"Saving our planet, lifting people out of poverty, advancing economic growth... these are one and the same fight. We must connect the dots between climate change, water scarcity, energy shortages, global health, food security, and women's empowerment." – Ban Ki-moon, Former UN Secretary General.*

## Conclusion

A critical and fundamental goal for COP27 is to keep warming at no higher than 1.5°C. Achieving this admittedly would come at great cost entailed in the deep and systemic shift across sectors to facilitate transitioning to lower GHG emission. The magnitude of the challenge would be considerable and could necessitate changes of productive and economic systems not just to directly reduce domestic generation of GHGs, but also fundamental production and lifestyle changes aimed at achieving the same objective. Such adjustment though is costly, which is why there has been resistance and hesitancy among some major polluters who, as a result, have not been sufficiently ambitious in cutting back their emissions.

The changes will only happen if demand, supply and costs facing businesses and the general population sufficiently “reward” practices that cut back on GHG emissions whilst disincentivising those that do not. For this, creative new arrangements will be needed with incentives, fiscal and financial measures and other mechanisms aimed at changing behaviour.

Dealing with the consequences of a warmer world whilst laying the foundations for a climate-safe one will require all nations to evolve their thinking on fair share, equity and vulnerability. It would also require significant financial burden sharing. The problem is global, the effort to find and implement remedies will also need to be global.

No country can continue in uncontrolled and irresponsible emission of GHGs without adversely affecting others. All countries, especially those with advanced economies, need to take responsibility tackling global warming as well as assisting developing countries do the same, including through providing them with the financial support that they need.

It is true that most developing countries were not major contributors to the accumulated GHGs in the atmosphere; neither were they the principal economic beneficiaries of the historical exploitation of the natural environment. Nonetheless, they too, including SIDS whose ecosystem assets are part of the global patrimony and of irreplaceable value, do not have a free pass to continue business as usual. Instead, they also must fulfil their proportionate role and responsibility.

But these vulnerable countries face real challenges in meeting the heavy cost of adaptation and resilience building. They also need and will inevitably continue to require compensation for the losses and damage that they are already suffering due to climate change, for which they are not responsible.

The November summit in Egypt is an opportunity for the world to recommit to ambitious individual country and collective international action. It will need to make concrete and substantial progress in comprehensively addressing climate change challenges. And this will only happen when countries, in particular all the major polluters, recognize and are willing to bear the costs of making the adjustments and enabling and facilitating adaptation by those less able to bear the burden on their own.

SIDS have always used the Alliance of Small Islands States (AOSIS) as their shared platform in the UN process. At COP 21 in 2015, they advanced well-developed and coherently and competently articulated positions in strategic partnerships with like-minded countries, groupings and with certain NGOs. This ensured that they were able to make a major positive contribution to the outcome of the Paris Conference and the level of ambition reflected in the Paris Agreement. The challenge this time in Egypt is to achieve similar meaningful influence.

- *“God gave us the earth, to till and to keep in a balanced and respectful way.”- Pope Francis*
- *“We are the first generation to feel the sting of climate change, and we are the last generation that can do something about it.” – Jay Inslee, US politician*